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COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES ON "EFFICIENT
CAPITAL MARKETS, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE,
AND ENRON'
Yaniv Grinsteint
INTRODUCTION
In his Article, Professor Jonathan R. Macey observes three impor-
tant points about the Enron fiasco and about the U.S. corporate gov-
ernance system in general.' His first observation is that Enron's
failure represents the failure of both objective and proximate moni-
toring mechanisms to protect shareholders. 2 His second observation
is that the Enron case casts into doubt the effectiveness of disclosure
rules,3 and the third questions how relevant the Efficient Capital Mar-
kets Hypothesis is after Enron.4 The following discussion provides
complementary perspectives on each of these three important
observations.
I
OBJECTIVITY AND PROXIMITY
Entities that monitor managerial actions comprise two groups.
5
The first group includes entities that are very close to management
and that are deeply involved in the activities of the firm,6 such as the
board of directors. Board members meet on a regular basis with the
corporate officers, participate in the decisionmaking process, and
have easy access to corporate information. The second group consists
of entities that are not close to management and that are not directly
involved in the activities of the firm.7 Examples of such entities in-
clude the market for corporate control, analysts, and credit rating
agencies.
t Assistant Professor of Finance, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell
University.
1 Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 COR-
NELL L. REV. 394 (2004).
2 Id. at 403.
3 Id. at 413.
4 Id. at 417-20.
5 Id. at 400-01; Arnoud W.A. Boot &Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Perform-
ance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L.
REv. 356, 356-57 (2004).
6 Macey, supra note 1, at 400; Boot & Macey, supra note 5, at 358-59.
7 Macey, supra note 1, at 401; Boot & Macey, supra note 5, at 359.
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Professors Boot and Macey base their model of corporate govern-
ance on a tradeoff.8 A monitor belonging to the first group has timely
information about the firm and can monitor proactively, but this
monitor risks capture because of its proximity to management.9 A
monitor who belongs to the second group does not have timely infor-
mation about the firm, and can only monitor ex post, i.e., after observ-
ing managerial wrongdoing. 10 Nevertheless, such outside monitoring
is likely to be more objective and less at risk of capture by
management.
Enron had monitoring mechanisms based on both proximity,
(the board of directors) and on objectivity (analysts, credit agencies
and other market agents).11 Both mechanisms failed to function
properly.' 2
Professor Macey convincingly explains the reasons why market
agents had no objectivity: analysts were biased partly because of the
relationship between their employer, the investment bank, and En-
ron.' 3 Credit agencies hesitated to downgrade Enron's debt because
they dreaded the overwhelming impact such a downgrade would have
on Enron and the possibility that their judgment was incorrect. 14 Fi-
nally, external auditors did not properly audit Enron partly because of
the faulty incentive structure of partners within the accounting
firms. 15
But what was wrong with the board of directors? Professor Macey
argues that they were bound to be captured by the management be-
cause of their strong proximity.' 6 My comments focus on this issue.
Like other monitors, the board of directors should have the
knowledge and incentives to execute its duties properly.17 In general,
the sources of board incentives may be divided into three groups-
ethical, legal, and monetary incentives.
8 Macey, supra note 1, at 400; Boot & Macey, supra note 5, at 358. For the psychologi-
cal theory underpinning proximity, see DAVID G. MvEPs, SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY 46-47 (1983)
(explaining the "foot-in-the-door phenomenon," which finds that individuals who agree to
do a small request at first eventually tend to become increasingly involved over time).
9 Boot & Macey, supra note 5, at 359.
10 Macey, supra note 1, at 401.
11 Id. at 403.
12 For details of the Enron scandal, see, for example, Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer
on Enron: Lessons from A Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical
Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REv. 163, 167-97 (2003).
13 Macey, supra note 1, at 404.
14 Id. at 405-06.
15 Id. at 407-10.
16 See id. at 400-01.
17 See Boot & Macey, supra note 5, at 361-64.
[Vol. 89:503
2004] EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS
Board members should have high ethical standards and sufficient
reputation concerns to properly perform their duties"' How high
were the reputation concerns of Enron's board? Table 1 shows that in
2001 Enron had fourteen board members, three of which (Lay, Skill-
ing and Belfer) were employees or former employees of Enron. The
rest of the board consisted of highly ranked corporate officers or for-
mer officers (Blake, Chan, Pereira, Savage, Winokur), distinguished
academic personnel (Gramm, Jaedicke, Lemaistre, Mendelsohn), and
distinguished public service personnel (Wakeham, Gramm).
TABLE 1: ENRON'S BOARD MEMBERS AND THEIR OCCUPATION, MAY 2001
(TAKEN FROM ENRON'S PROXY STATEMENT, 2001)19
Director
Director Name Since Age Occupation
ROBERT A. BELFER 1983 65 CEO and Chairman of Belco Oil & Gas
Corp.
Former employee of Belco Petroleum
Corp., a wholly owned subsidiary of Enron.
NORMAN P. BLAKE, JR. 1993 59 CEO, Chairman and President of Comdisco
I Inc.
RONNIE C. CHAN 1996 51 Chairman of Hang Lung Group
JOHN H. DUNCAN 1985 73 Investor. Also a director of EOTT Energy
Corp. and Group I Automotive Inc.
WENDY L. GRAMM 1993 56 Director of the Regulatory Studies Program
of the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University. Former Chairman of
Commodity Futures Trading Commission in
Washington, D.C.
ROBERT K. JAEDICKE 1985 72 Professor (Emeritus) of Accounting,
Stanford University Graduate School of
Business
KENNETH L. LAY 1985 58 Chairman of the Board, Enron
CHARLES A. LEMAISTRE 1985 77 President Emeritus of the University of
Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center
JOHN MENDELSOHN 1999 64 President of the University of Texas M.D.
Anderson Cancer Center
PAULO V. FERRAZ PEREIRA 1999 46 Executive Vice President of Group Bozano.
Former President and CEO of the State
Bank of Rio de Janeiro
FRANK SAVAGE 1999 62 Chairman, Alliance Capital Management
International
JEFFREY K. SKILLING 1997 47 CEO, Enron
JOHN WAKEHAM 1994 68 Former U.K. Secretary of State for Energy
and Leader of the Houses of Commons
and Lords
HERBERT S. WINOKUR, JR. 1985 57 CEO and Chairman, Capricorn Holdings,
Inc.
Average 1990 62
18 Cf Michael L. Fox, To Tell or Not To Tell: Legal Ethics and Disclosure After Enron, 2002
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 867, 887-913 (discussing the disclosure requirements imposed on
attorneys as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
19 The information contained in the table of board members and occupations comes
from Enron's 2001 proxy statement. ENRON CORP., PROXY STATEMENTr 5-8 (Mar. 27, 2001).
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The second source of incentives comes from fear of legal punish-
ment. Shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders can sue board
members who violate their duties. Apparently, Enron's board mem-
bers had lots of reputation at stake, but concern for reputation and
legal punishment failed to provide adequate incentives for board
members of Enron to demand explanations for questionable deals.
The last source of board incentives is monetary. As agents of the
shareholders, board members should be concerned with maximizing
shareholder wealth.20 If board members have a long-term financial
stake in the firm, maximizing shareholder wealth maximizes their own
wealth. Thus, board incentives to monitor effectively are aligned with
the shareholders they represent.
Table 2 shows the stock holdings of the board members of Enron
in 2001.
20 See Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance Failures and the Managerial Duty of Care, 76
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 767, 780-81 (2002) (stating that Enron's board of directors breached
the duty of care to shareholders).
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Enron board members held a total of approximately 16,000,000
shares of Enron stock. This amount accounts for about 2.5% of the
common shares outstanding, but employees and former employees
held 97% of these shares. The six members of the audit committee
held about 100,000 shares (average of only 18,000 shares per person),
and the members of the nominating committee held even fewer. 22
With such low holdings, the board members' monetary incentives
were probably insufficient to maximize the value of Enron. Unfortu-
nately, these low numbers are not unique to Enron. Outside, non-
employee board members of large U.S. corporations often hold mi-
nuscule financial stakes in the firms they monitor.
How can board incentives improve so that directors are less
prone to be captured by management? Scrutiny of board qualifica-
tions, independence, and increased penalties are important ingredi-
ents, but it seems that directors also need financial incentives to
monitor properly. Board members should have large enough finan-
cial interests in the corporation, so that their actions matter not only
to the shareholders they represent but also to themselves.
II
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE RULES
Professor Macey also examines corporate disclosure rules and the
traditional theory of information disclosure based on signaling.23
When shareholders cannot tell whether a firm is good or bad, the
managers of that firm look for a mechanism that convinces the share-
holders that the firm is good. Signaling mechanisms are important
because they reveal information to the shareholders about the value
of the firm. 24 A signaling mechanism can work only if it is credible. In
other words, an essential ingredient of a signaling mechanism is that it
should be less costly for a good firm to use than for a bad firm. In the
famous lemon problem, a car buyer does not know if the dealer sells
him a good car or a lemon in disguise. 25 The car seller would like to
convince the buyer that the car is functioning because otherwise, the
buyer places a low value on the car. The dealer can use a warranty to
convince the buyer to place a high value on the car. With a warranty,
the dealer commits to pay damages if the car is sub-par. However, a
dealer of bad cars will not provide a warranty because such a warranty
would be too costly. Thus, a warranty separates the dealer of good
cars from a dealer of bad cars.
22 Id.
23 Macey, supra note 1, at 415-17.
24 Macey, supra note 1, at 396 & n.7.
25 George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-92 (1970).
508 [Vol. 89:503
EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS
The same theory applies to corporate disclosure. Good firms dis-
close information about themselves to distinguish themselves from
bad firms.26 It is too costly for bad firms to disclose information be-
cause the information will reveal that they are bad.27 Investors, then,
will invest in firms that disclose information and avoid firms that do
not similarly disclose information.
But is disclosure of information such a good mechanism to sepa-
rate the good from the bad firms? If firms can easily manipulate the
information they provide and the penalty for cheating is not severe
enough, information disclosure is not an effective mechanism for sep-
arating the good firms from the bad.
Professor Macey argues that in Enron's case, the market was likely
unaware that Enron failed to disclose all information so investors con-
tinued to believe that the value of Enron was high. 28 The market be-
lieved that disclosure was a good mechanism for separating good
firms from bad firms when, in fact, firms could manipulate their dis-
closure schemes and cheat the market.29
Taking this situation as given, Professor Macey points to two inter-
esting externalities of cheating. First, if firm A cheats and shows posi-
tive earnings, firm A will receive market support at the expense of
firm B, who does not cheat and shows negative earnings. Thus, firm A
will have strong incentives to cheat.30 Moreover, since firm B will lose
from not cheating, firm B also will have strong incentives to cheat.31
Second, because firms that cheat do not internalize the entire cost of
getting caught, they are not discouraged from cheating.32 The cost of
Enron getting caught, however, is real enough: it is the public distrust
of other firms and of the corporate system. 33 If Enron had internal-
ized these costs, it might have thought twice about whether to hide its
debt.
These two alarming externalities portray a much worse picture
than the one suggested by traditional models of corporate disclosure.
To solve this problem, Professor Macey suggests increasing the threat
of penalty for cheating "because a severe punishment for false report-
ing will eliminate firms' incentive to cheat."34
I would like to take these arguments a step further. While the
traditional model of information disclosure likely did not hold in the
26 Macey, supra note 1, at 412.
27 Id. at 414.
28 See id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 415-17.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See id. at 415.
34 Id. at 417.
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case of Enron, I believe it is still a relevant tool for understanding
investor behavior in the future. The models of externalities presented
above assume that the market is unaware that corporations can ma-
nipulate disclosure and that the market believes that the disclosed in-
formation is correct. The market's belief, however, is fragile. Once
the market observes evidence that causes it to change its belief, the
equilibrium that Professor Macey suggests no longer holds. Enron
caused many investors to question their beliefs about the credibility of
financial disclosure. 35 Between November 2001 and June 2002, the
market saw more and more cases of corporate earning scandals, in-
cluding Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Sunbeam, Adelphia, and
others. 36 This mounting evidence alarmed investors, and regulators
reacted to these concerns by implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and tougher SEC measures.
Besides disclosure, financial economics literature points to other
ways in which firms can signal their true worth. One such mechanism
is the payment of dividends. 37 Firms can potentially use these mecha-
nisms to increase shareholder confidence in them in the future.
III
EFFICIENT MARKETS
With respect to the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis
(ECMH) ,38 Professor Macey convincingly argues that the writing was
on the wall, but no one read it properly. However, one can interpret
these results consistent with the ECMH by assuming that investors did
see the impenetrable accounting and the questionable transactions
but believed the optimistic view of the analysts and interpreted these
signs as harmless. Even if the market did not see these signs, one
might optimistically conclude that the EMCH is still relevant after En-
ron. If we assume that, at least to some extent, the market learns from
mistakes, then this event may actually increase efficiency in the future.
The grim results of the Enron fiasco may provide incentives for all
market participants to become more skeptical and alert.
35 Id. at 414 (arguing that investors will reexamine their beliefs).
36 See, e.g., Dennis K. Berman & Deborah Solomon, Analysts Fault the Accounting at
Global Crossing, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 30, 2002, at A8; YochiJ. Dreazen, WorldCom Suspends Execu-
tives in Scandal over Order Booking, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2002, at A3; Kelly Greene, Dunlap
Agrees To Settle Suit over Sunbeam, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 15, 2002, at A3; SEC Fnmally Opens Probe of
Adelphia, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2002, at BI.
37 Sudipto Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "the Bird in the
Hand"Fallacy, 10 BELLJ. ECON. 259, 260-63 (1979).
38 Macey, supra note 1, at 417-20. The ECMH posits that prices of shares in publicly
traded companies will rapidly adjust to in accordance with new learned information. Id. at
396-97.
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